Lecture 2	Nonday, November 23, 2020 6
	CS59000_RL Theory
	Pelicy Gradient
	Agenda
	Performana Difference Lemma
	_ Gradient Domination
	- Global optimality "
	Fer discounted setting
	Dyor of pan day day day day day day day
\ -	
	occupancy Kernel
	Fer undis Countel.
	νη(πο) = 5 μ(η)(σπ(α; η) Q (η, α) da) dn
	> Way to estimate: I Monte Carlo sampling 7 1965 Bayesian Quarature 12 Rayesian
	Bayesian Quarature
	L> Bay eslan
	an advekume
	Po hicy
	Gradient
	Akelly 2020

Monday,	November 23,	2020
---------	--------------	------

Parametrization; OE (1); Mg
Consider the finite state action MDP.
- Direct parametrization
$\int_{\mathcal{O}} (a; n) = \theta \Rightarrow \text{and} \sum_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \theta_{\alpha n} = 1 \forall n \in \mathcal{X}$
an a
_ Softmax Parametrization
$ \Pi_{\theta}(\alpha; n) = \frac{\exp(\theta_{\alpha n})}{\sum_{\alpha'} \exp(\theta_{\alpha' n})} $
$\sum_{n} e_{x} p(\theta_{n})$
Side note 1 MM > Dady y(M) => need For direct (Parametrization) Parametrization) Onto simplex
General function Classes
7 (a; n) = f(n,a); E f(n,a)=1

Consider the discounted finite state action MDP.
Define: Advantage function A(A, a) s Vn, a
Define: Advantage function A(A, a): Vn, a Ex. A A(n, a) = Q(n, a) - V(n)
Lemma (Performance difference Lamm; Kakade &
Lemma (Performance difference Lamm; Kakade & Langford 2002 M (T) - M(T) = Ex [E[A (X,A)[X]] MR
proof in Final. (Azizzedemesheli 2018) Pompp
What is policy gradient for direct parametrization
$M^{s}(n') = \sum_{n} M^{s}(n'; n) P_{s}(n)$
10)=(-x) \(\Sigma\) \(\sigma
$\frac{\partial \rho_{\alpha N}}{\partial \rho_{\alpha N}} = (1-8) Q(N_{\alpha}) M(N) $
- San

∇ y(170) = (1-8) y Q

Lebr	i denobe en a	pobimal policy	
Lemm	a: Fer direct po	grametrization	
	-d> / 10 ³	5	7
2(1	1") - y(n) < // / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /	man (n-1	(a)
<i>></i> > -)-8 h	U Qo	4
proof	;		_
•		_	Grachient
			Cominance
			Setting
η(π*)	-7(11) = Z Mr.	(n) (1 (a; n)	An (n1a)
1-8	- naex	*	
	(Z)	har (n) max A	n (MB)
	· EX		9
Empiliait .	5 M	*(n) 8	Non-negative
ass mption 1/	= EX I	17 (N) (N) (N)	nax An(hia)
	•		
	< 1 mg / mg	Sex Ma (n)	max A (ma)
	1.1	· CX	

Monday, November 23, 2020 = 11 man I Man (n) 11 (a; n) A(n) a) Remember [Ta; n) A (ma) so > - Mn+ 1 mas Zng (n) (n (a; n) - n (a; n) / (n (a; n)) $= \frac{1}{2\pi} \left[\max_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{1}{m_{\alpha}(\alpha)} \right) \left(\prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}} - \prod_{\alpha \in \mathcal{A}}$ = 1 men Trant (n-n) => Projected gradient ascent: ; 17 = 17 int

	Theorem: (Projected gradient ascent);
	The projected gradient ascent algorithm on $\gamma(\pi)$ with stepsize $\alpha = (LY)^3$, van for
	Titerations satisfies:
	min 2(17) - 2(17) (E t (T
	whenever 7 > 64 8 X A Sup Man Ma
Preof	Finel.
	Natural policy gradient
	Let's imagine our policy Kerneli's Pavametriza
	with 0; 170 from (x, x 1x)) to (L, x(L))
	remember $y(T_0) = \int_{X} M(n) (\int_{B} G; X) \overline{Y}(N_1G) dG$



what if we change B, but To would not chang!

We want to change 8 such that To changes
sufficiently
> we chang the geometry of B



Consider Fisher information (state-dependent)

and Fisher information matrix


$$F(0) = E_{n_0} \left[F(x; 0) \right]$$

Fisher information matrix induces a Remanion geometry such that locally the parameters of 17 apre metrix in variant

> (look Amaris book) information Geometry and application 1995 et al.)

=> Notural policy gradient:

Fn(10) = Fo Pn(0)



Natural gordients are essential in probabilistics optimization and the design of seometry bary optimizer.